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Global Ethics for Social Work: Problems and Possibilities 
 
Papers from the Ethics and Social Welfare Symposium, Durban, 
July 2008  
 
 
Sarah Banks1, Richard Hugman2, Lynne Healy3, Vivienne Bozalek4 and Joan 
Orme5 
 
 
This piece comprises short presentations given by contributors to a 
symposium organised by the journal Ethics and Social Welfare on the 
theme of global ethics for social work. The contributors offer their 
reflections on the extent to which universally accepted international 
statements of ethical principles in social work are possible or useful, 
engaging with debates about cultural diversity, relativism and the 
relevance of human rights in non-western countries. 
 
Key words: global ethics, social work ethics, universalism, human rights, 
cultural relativism 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Sarah Banks 
 
The journal sponsored a symposium at the 34th Biennial Congress of the 
International Association of Schools of Social Work held in Durban, South Africa 
from 20th to 24th July 2008. The theme of the congress was Transcending Global-
Local Divides. We decided to organize the symposium to give particular 
consideration to the role of international statements on ethics in social work. 
Several members of the editorial and advisory boards of the journal had been 
involved in drafting the joint statement of ethical principles agreed by the 
International Federation of Social Workers (IFSW) and International Association 
of Schools of Social Work (IASSW) in 2004. This statement is due to be reviewed 
                                                 
1 Sarah Banks is Professor in the School of Applied Social Sciences, Durham University, UK and 
co-editor of the journal Ethics and Social Welfare. E-mail: s.j.banks@durham.ac.uk  
2
 Richard Hugman is Professor of Social Work, School of Social Sciences and International 
Studies, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia.  E-mail: r.hugman@unsw.edu.au.  
3
 Lynne M. Healy is Professor, University of Connecticut School of Social Work, USA. E-mail: 
Lynne.healy@uconn.edu 
4
 Vivienne Bozalek is Professor in Social Work at the University of Western Cape, South Africa. 
E-mail: vbozalek@uwc.ac.za 
5
 Joan Orme is Professor Emerita of Social Work, University of Glasgow, UK. E-mail: 
j.orme@socsci.gla.ac.uk 
 
 3 
during the next two years leading to a revised version in 2010. We are very 
aware that all such international statements have their critics and their 
advocates. This statement is relatively brief and remains at the level of general 
principles, clustered around two overarching principles of respecting and 
promoting human rights and social justice We know from previous consultations 
in 2004 that there are some who feel the IFSW/IASSW statement is too ‘western’ 
in its language and approach (particularly the language of universal principles, 
individual rights and self-determination). Indeed, the question has been raised as 
to whether such an international statement with universal relevance is either 
possible or desirable. On the other hand, equally cogent arguments have been 
made that the language of universal human rights is very important, especially in 
contexts where inhumane treatment, such as torture, imprisonment without trial 
or denial of benefits to asylum seekers, is taking place, and in which social 
workers may be implicated or involved. 
      
The aim of the symposium was to engage four key speakers and our audience in 
critical dialogue and debate about the possibilities and problems of international 
statements on ethics in social work. Four questions were identified in advance 
around which to focus our discussion as follows:   
 
1. What role, if any, can international statements on ethics in social work play in 
promoting social justice? 
2. Does 'rights' talk get in the way or is it essential for an international 
statement?  
3. Must recognition of cultural diversity lead to ethical relativism or is it 
compatible with a modified form of universalism in ethics? 
4. What are the implications of these debates for the framing of international 
statements on ethics, such as the current IASSW/IFSW document?  
 
In this account of the symposium, we include accounts of the short presentations 
made by our four speakers (Richard Hugman, Lynne Healy, Vivienne Bozalek 
and Joan Orme), a summary of some of the key points from the discussion and 
concluding comments by the chair of the symposium (Sarah Banks). We hope 
this will contribute to the debate on these issues and, in particular, to the process 
of revising the international statement on ethics in social work.    
 
 
1. Ethics in a World of Difference 
 
Richard Hugman 
 
In an article that I published recently in this journal (Hugman, 2008) I began by 
commenting that international statements about social work ethics have been 
criticized as imposing western values in non-western contexts.  I identified two 
forms of this criticism in recent literature, one ‘strong’ in that it calls for each 
cultural context to generate its own relevant values, exemplified in a recent article 
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by Yip (2004), the other ‘qualified’ in that while it seeks basic common values it 
calls for these to be interpreted with cultural sensitivity, exemplified in a recent 
article by Healy (2007). Such arguments raise a particular problem with the 
notion of human rights as a foundation for social work ethics.  In response, I 
suggested in the article that the idea of a plurality of values is more fruitful and 
the concept of ‘human capabilities’ (Nussbaum, 2000) could be regarded as a 
basis for dialogue about values that cross cultural differences.   
At the symposium I developed further some of the arguments articulated in the 
article, suggesting that international statements have a role to play in the form of 
guidance that has to be understood and responded to in context. I argued that 
‘rights talk’ is useful if it is understood as a means to assisting people to live a 
'fully human life' (Nussbaum, 2000). It creates argument in so far as it either 
exposes vested interests in maintaining relationships that are to the benefit of 
some at the detriment of others (which it correctly challenges) or when it imposes 
one view of the good life inappropriately on another culture or world-view (when it 
must be reconsidered).  It is the reconsideration in such a way as not to 
undermine the idea of rights as the expectation of a fully human life that is 
difficult.  
 
In response to the question about whether recognition of cultural diversity 
necessarily leads to ethical relativism, or whether it is compatible with a modified 
form of universalism in ethics, I made the following point: cultural diversity is 
separate from ethical relativism - the latter is neither necessary nor helpful, while 
the former is both.  Ideas of ethical pluralism may help us, but these are complex 
and we have only just started to think them through in social work. 
 
I then commented on the implications of these debates for the framing of 
international statements on ethics, such as the current IFSW/IASSW (2004) 
document. I argued that it means that we must find better ways to maintain and 
develop dialogue in which different voices can be heard, which seek to find new 
ways to approach the core values that the profession shares across cultural 
differences. 
 
 
2) Global Ethical Principles: Universalism and Complexities of Meaning 
 
Lynne Healy 
 
In the 2007 article referred to by Richard Hugman, I presented a brief case 
vignette in order to explore the complexities of ethical decision making in the 
context of the universalism-relativism debate (Healy, 2007). The follow up 
discussion of the case in the article by Richard Hugman (2008) and the additional 
questions he raised, continued the dialogue about universality and underscored 
the core point that complexities face social work practitioners as they wrestle with 
ethical dilemmas. The extent to which social work ethical principles are 
universally applicable is also being examined as prelude to reconsideration of the 
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2004 document, Ethics in Social Work, Statement of Principles by IFSW and 
IASSW. In this brief commentary, I raise two additional issues for consideration 
regarding universality. These are prioritizing values when they are in conflict, and 
discerning the meaning attached to the principles by service users in diverse 
contexts. Thus, even if the profession agrees on a set of universal values or 
ethical principles, there may be culturally based disagreements over the meaning 
of these principles and how they should be prioritized. 
 
Practitioners are bombarded with legal mandates, agency regulations and 
procedures, and the often competing values expressed in the profession’s ethical 
documents. Even the relatively brief joint IFSW/IASSW document identifies a 
number of core ethical principles. Challenges arise when all principles cannot be 
optimized. One approach to competing values is to rank order them in a 
hierarchy of principles that can be used in situations when multiple principles 
conflict (Harrington and Dolgoff, 2008).  The hierarchy of principles proposed by 
Dolgoff, Loewenberg and Harrington (2005) identifies and rank orders seven 
ethical principles: preservation of life; equality; autonomy and freedom; least 
harm; quality of life; privacy/confidentiality; and truthfulness and full disclosure. A 
single case may involve some or even all seven principles (as in the case 
discussed in Healy, 2007). Recent informal research indicates ‘very little 
consensus on the ordering of the ethical principles’ but general support for the 
use of value hierarchies (Harrington and Dolgoff, 2008, p. 190). It is likely that 
culture and context influence rank ordering of ethical principles even when there 
is agreement on the importance of the principles themselves. Thus national 
professional associations may wish to consider more particularized value 
screens or hierarchies, ‘prioritizing the universal values in a more culturally 
relevant hierarchy’ (Healy, 2007, p. 24). 
 
Additionally, social workers and service users/clients may attach different 
meanings to some of the ethical principles, adding a further layer of complexity in 
considering whether principles can be universally applied. In utilizing global 
ethical statements, it is important to ask whether the important ethical principles 
in fact mean the same in all contexts. Or, is the challenge to determine their 
meaning to the service users, whether individuals or communities? The ethical 
practitioner should be encouraged to search with the service user or client for the 
meaning attached to the principles or rights involved. The principle of avoiding 
doing harm is particularly interesting. Indeed, Harrington and Dolgoff’s (2008) 
informal research identified least harm as the highest ranked ethical principle 
when rank orderings were averaged. Yet least harm and quality of life are 
principles that are particularly difficult to apply universally. Drawing on the 
example of social work in situations of domestic violence, it is possible that the 
same professional practice or actions cause different levels of harm to the 
service user, depending on the meaning she attaches to independence, agency, 
and affiliation. These meanings in part derive from cultural context. 
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Social work ethics have been linked to human rights concepts and the 
discussions over universalism/relativism are therefore tied to similar debates 
within the human rights arena. Hugman (2008) explores the work of Nussbaum 
(2000) on the capabilities approach as an alternative to human rights. While 
interesting, I do not find that the capabilities approach resolves the dilemma of 
conflicting and competing values or the issue of assigning meaning to core 
concepts in diverse cultures. In practice in domestic abuse situations, for 
example, capabilities for a life with bodily integrity and for a life with affiliations 
raise the same tensions as are embedded in applying a human rights 
perspective.  
 
As we move forward with a review and possible revision of the international 
statement of ethical principles for social work, the perspective of culturally aware 
universalism may best suit the profession. I hope views on wording and meaning 
from cultures that are more communalist in their outlook will be assertively 
solicited to ensure expression of principles in a way that captures ideas about 
caring, reciprocity, community-building and cooperation for incorporation into 
social work ethical principles. This is not an endorsement of relativism nor is it 
advocating retreat from social work’s important emphasis on human rights; rather 
it is an appreciation that defining and applying ethical principles within and 
especially across cultures is complex. 
 
For the practitioner, it is particularly important to be as aware as possible of the 
impact of her or his own culture on interpretation of principles and strive to be 
open to alternative interpretations, especially those of the service user/client. As 
a feminist from the most highly individualistic culture in the world (Hofstede, 
1980), I have moved from a position of assertive universalism to a slightly more 
moderated stance. In practice, this would mean promoting universal rights or 
perhaps, capabilities, while recognizing culture as one of those rights and 
acknowledging that my definition and valuation of harm and quality of life may 
differ from those of others. As the revised ‘golden rule’ states, we should treat 
others not as we wish to be treated but as they wish to be treated. 
 
 
3) The Role of International Statements on Ethics in Social Work in 
Promoting Social Justice 
 
Vivienne Bozalek 
 
I agree with Richard Hugman that international statements are important in 
promoting social justice for social work. Such statements can provide a form of 
accountability for social workers towards service users and for the profession as 
a whole. These statements also set minimum standards that are helpful for social 
workers, particularly, for example, in countries where there are abuses of human 
rights.  In these contexts international statements can be called upon in order to 
advocate for better arrangements and conditions for both service users and 
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providers.  For example, historically, social work in South Africa was developed 
to alleviate the poor white problem in the 1930s by the architect of apartheid, 
Hendrik Verwoed, well known for his racist and anti-Semitic ideas. Social work in 
South Africa was thus a racially exclusive system associated with Afrikaner 
nationalism. International statements of ethics based on notions of social justice 
in social work could have been used to legally challenge such abuses of human 
rights which excluded groups of citizens, which in the South African case was the 
majority of the population.  
 
International statements are also useful in that they can be used to strengthen 
social workers’ positions in locations where they may be co-opted by corrupt 
states.  In apartheid South Africa, social workers were complicit in removing 
babies from mothers who were anti-apartheid activists detained for their political 
beliefs and activities as a form of punishment for these mothers. Those in 
detention were not able to challenge these abuses of their rights, as they did not 
have access to international statements on ethics to defend and promote their 
rights.  Similarly, international human rights documents were developed in 
response to complicit behaviour by medical practitioners in concentration camps 
in Nazi Germany (Sevenhuijsen, 2003a) and in prisons under the apartheid 
regime.(see Baldwin-Ragaven et al, 1999 for more details on this) 
 
While acknowledging the positive contribution that international ethical 
statements can play there are, however, critiques of relying solely on these 
statements for ethical practice in social work.  I will outline some of the issues 
that have been raised as problematic with international ethical statements and 
discuss how the political ethics of care as developed by Tronto (1993) and 
Sevenhuisen (1998) could be used as an alternative frame of reference to 
address these problematic areas. 
 
International ethics statements as legalistic 
International ethics statements can be regarded as legalistic, adversarial and 
mechanistic (Code, 1995; Sevenhuijsen, 2003a). This might entail having to fight 
for one’s rights against a legal system or against someone else – and in some 
cases the outcomes may not be adequately followed through (O’ Neill, 1988). 
Codes of ethics do not always guarantee ethical behaviour. I wonder how many 
of us have sat through tedious ethics committee meetings at higher education 
institutions and wondered whether the ethical practice is in fact ever properly 
followed through after all the assurances have been given?   
 
Self reliance and independence as goals  
A further problem that has been identified with international ethics statements is 
the focus on ‘self reliance’ or having independence as the ultimate goal, with 
non-interference rather than active intervention seen as a positive attribute 
(Sevenhuijsen, 2003a). Both Eva Kittay (2002) and Joan Tronto (2002) point out 
that theories of justice, such as that of John Rawls (1971), upon which 
international ethical statements are based, fail to take dependency and care into 
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account. The idea of ‘rational economic man’ who is disembodied, autonomous, 
independent and equal is the normative ideal of a citizen that Rawls had in mind. 
This man is furthermore able to enter voluntarily into exchanges of goods and 
social cooperation with other citizens for his own benefit. From this perspective, 
rights are regarded as a means to ensuring fairness.  
 
An assumption of sameness for equality 
Another criticism of international ethical statements is that they have a limited 
ability to deal with difference, otherness and plurality. A political ethic of care 
allows a vision of otherness and takes into account inequality, vulnerability, 
finiteness and difference in human interrelationships, which a rights-based or 
justice perspective elides in its concentration on equality and sameness for all. A 
rights-based approach which assumes sameness does not provide enough 
nuances to deal adequately with the particularity of peoples’ needs. Incorporating 
human dependency into an idea of citizenship foregrounds the notion of 
interdependence and relationality in that all human beings need assistance and 
are socially dependent on each other to provide the resources and means with 
which to meet our needs. If it is acknowledged that we are all dependent and 
need care at various points in our lives and that caregivers as citizens should be 
provided with the means to carry out care to the best of their ability, it follows that 
an ethically just society should provide the arrangements to make this possible.  
The political ethics of care proposes a relational self, continually in the process of 
changing, which is in contrast to the universalist rights-based atomistic view of 
humans with predetermined identities (Sevenhuijsen, 1998). 
 
The politics of needs interpretation 
Tronto (2002) raises some important questions, which arise from the political 
ethic of care in relation to the distribution of resources. For example, in order to 
decide how to distribute resources in a just way, we must first establish what 
needs exist. However, how needs are defined and who defines the needs in a 
particular context are contested as Nancy Fraser (1989) has pointed out in her 
politics of needs interpretation. Tronto (2002) also alerts us to the dimensions of 
power and privilege that exist in caring relationships.  She reminds us that those 
who are more powerfully positioned in society assume the position of demanders 
of care, whilst at the same time underplaying their dependency on others. She 
suggests this is crucial to their ability to carry out responsibilities in the public 
sphere.  In terms of the care perspective, the public private is a false dichotomy 
as care impacts on one’s life in both the public and private spheres and the 
responsibility for care provision and arrangements need to be considered from a 
societal and personal viewpoint. 
 
Agency versus abstract principles 
The political ethics of care is based on the practice of care rather than a set of 
abstract principles that can be followed and takes into account responsibilities 
and relationships. It takes as its starting point the needs of the other in examining 
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what should be done. Rights-based approaches, in contrast, examine the 
potentialities of citizens rather than their agency in the present (Cockburn, 2005). 
 
Particularity versus universality 
What is regarded as adequate care will differ from one context to another.  The 
political ethic of care allows decisions to be made in specific situations rather 
than applying universal principles. Both the political ethics of care and the human 
capabilities approach as articulated by economist Amartya Sen (1999) and 
philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2000) provide the perspective which allows one 
to ask the question: ‘what are actually concrete human beings able to do and to 
be and what is necessary for human flourishing?’ This concrete other is 
perceived in particular circumstances and within relationships, in contrast with 
Rawls’s (1971) ‘generalised other’ about whose circumstances and preferences 
nothing is known (Benhabib,1992). Nussbaum (2000) has identified ten basic 
human capabilities, without which she maintains that one would not be able to 
achieve a fully human life. These are: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, 
imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; 
play; and control over one’s environment.     
 
Dialogue and voice versus the impartial view 
The care ethic as developed by Tronto (1993) incorporates attentiveness, 
responsibility to act on caring needs, competence and responsiveness.  
Sevenhuijsen (1998; 2003b) has added trust, which has to do with conditions of 
vulnerability. Good caring practice requires negotiation and dialogue between 
those giving and receiving care, rather than an abstract, impartial view as 
required by rights-based approaches. Service users can discuss the sorts of 
resources and assistance that they would need.  The political care ethic draws 
attention to the voice of both the caregivers and the care receivers and 
foregrounds the narrative process of needs deliberation. Attentiveness requires 
listening to what people are saying in words and what they are not saying, as 
well as paying attention to the particularity of their unique needs (Barnes and 
Brannelly, 2008, p.387). The ethics of care also involves reflexivity in that the 
practitioner has to reflect on the caring process, which is a dialogical one. 
  
 
4) Global Ethics for Social Work: Problems and Possibilities 
 
Joan Orme 
 
My aim is to problematise the notion of a global statement of principles, not to 
stifle debate but to provide a context for the discussion provided by others. In 
producing the statement of principles IFSW and IASSW asserted that the 
intention was not to produce a code of ethics for social work. However there is a 
danger that once principles are ‘agreed’ and committed to paper they become 
powerful. This is particularly the case when the document includes imperatives 
such as ‘social workers should…’ and calls upon members of IFSW and IASSW 
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to ‘regularly update their own codes of ethics or ethical guidelines to be 
consistent…’ (IFSW and IASSW, 2004). 
 
The global context of social work emphasizes the wealth of traditions that require 
to be addressed in all teaching, research and scholarship. The very notion of 
principles and codification has its origins in western philosophy and practice.  
Rather than concentrate on ‘consistent’ principles or guidelines an international 
association needs facilitate dialogue between individuals, groups and nations. If 
documents are to be created they should have the status of a ‘temporarily 
negotiated agreement’ to recognize that ethics themselves are constructed in, 
and contingent upon, social, geographical and historical contexts. This can be 
problematic when students in particular and practitioners in general have a need 
for guidance akin to codification. This need is clearly articulated in the case 
described by Lynn Healy (2007). It is precisely because of what is driving that 
need that caution is required. As social work educators we should be facilitating 
what Husband calls ‘morally active practitioners’ (Husband, 1995) encouraging 
the ‘moral impulse’ (Bauman, 1993), the personal capacity to act morally, which 
arises out of responsibility to the other, and not to an employer, or a regulatory 
body.  
 
However, current trends indicate that practitioners are under pressure to act 
consistently and predictably, as has been highlighted by recent work on 
registration of social workers (Orme and Rennie, 2006).  In fact, the 
IASSW/IFSW statement on Global Standards for Education and Training of the 
Social Work Profession (adopted 2004, published 2005) suggested that the 
formulation of a code of ethics was a necessary adjunct to registration. However 
in a comparison of two countries it was identified that codes of conduct or codes 
of practice rather than codes of ethics accompanied the introduction of 
registration. This was seen as a defensive process; part of a managerialist 
approach associated with the technicalisation of the social work profession 
(Orme and Rennie, 2006). This means that practitioners have little 
encouragement to reflect on the distinction between what Hugman (2003, p. 
1030) has called ‘acting well and acting correctly’.  
 
To facilitate and enable practitioners to do this, as educators we have to go 
beyond teaching moral theories (Gray, 1995), or ‘introducing’ students to an 
already formulated set of ethical principles. The complexity of this task has been 
highlighted by feminist critiques of the concept of care. The ethics of care 
articulated by Tronto, Sevenhuijsen and others and discussed by Vivienne 
Bozalek above is a case in point. Students and practitioners often interpret their 
responsibility to others as an assertion that it is their ‘duty’ to care for others, 
without recognizing the nuances of caring that can be incorporated into 
understandings of ‘care’ discussed within feminist literature (Orme, 2002). 
 
There is therefore a need to ensure that the nuances and complexities of moral 
theory and philosophy highlighted in the forum and recorded here become an 
 11 
integral part of the social work curriculum.6 Because many subjects compete for 
space, and learning and education also takes place in practice settings it is 
imperative that students, and their educators (university teachers and 
practitioners), recognize that all situations in which social workers intervene are 
morally contentious and ambiguous and require considered reflection of the 
theoretical complexities behind the statement rather than a formulaic application 
of the principles identified.  
 
 
5) Notes from the discussion  
 
Compiled by Joan Orme 
 
Questions and comments from the floor included the following: 
 
1. The importance of language was noted, with a comment made that the 
discussion centred around certain dualities, including: care versus service; 
principles versus codes; morality versus ethical consciousness. It was 
suggested that we need to beware of setting up false dualities. 
 
 
2. When discussing human rights we need to acknowledge who gets afforded 
the status of a human being, in particular, who gets afforded status to make 
decisions as a human being. Ethical principles should expand beyond human 
beings to be meaningful in other cultures that have an affinity with the natural 
world. 
 
3. The discussion tended to frame human rights as an individual issue, but 
structures also have an impact. Are ethical dilemmas too often individualized, 
that is, privatized, to individual practices with service users? We need to 
politicise ethics. 
 
4. A comment was made about the fact that social workers who practised under 
the apartheid regime had a code of ethics. There were also social workers 
who were part of the liberationist struggle. The question was raised: what part 
does history play in how we arrive at ethical principles? 
 
5. It was suggested that ‘ethics’ as a topic is larger than human rights. There is a 
need for focus on particular aspects such as the distinction between negative 
and positive rights and implications for ‘the political’. 
 
                                                 
6 In the UK for example the social work qualification became a degree level qualification in 
2003.In a recent review (Department of Health, 2008) there is little evidence that moral 
philosophy is a core part of the curriculum. 
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6. We also need more discussion about the links between social work ethics for 
and in practice and ethics in social work research. This should address 
methodological as well as process issues. 
 
7. We were reminded that in the African context and in other countries people 
are deprived of human rights through imprisonment and being held hostage. 
This creates dilemmas for social workers.  
 
8. Social work is increasingly involved in rationing resources. This raises the 
question of how we deal with this as a profession in terms of ethical principles 
generally and human rights in particular. 
 
In summing up, the presenters made brief comments as follows: 
 
Lynne Healy acknowledged the breadth of the topic of human rights and drew 
attention to Jim Ife’s (2001) work. She mentioned modelling ethical principles 
through practice including teaching. She also commented that in the USA codes 
of ethics have helped protect social workers from being asked to be involved in 
activities that are ethically unacceptable. 
 
Vivienne Bozalek commented that the discussion of human rights issues took her 
to the work of Nancy Fraser (1989, 1997) with its attention to identity issues and 
notions of participatory parity. In terms of history, she acknowledged that we 
need to take cognisance of the South African experience under apartheid. 
 
Richard Hugman agreed that an historical perspective is vital, acknowledging the 
work of Bauman (1993) and his use of history, including the experience of the 
holocaust. In considering the question: ‘Why human rights?’, he replied that the 
stress on human is because the social work profession is one which attends to 
people. Social work starts from its concerns for the well being of the human 
world. No human being is excluded, but ethics is about being human. Non-
human animals do not have ethics. 
 
Joan Orme acknowledged the potential for the setting up of false dualities, 
highlighting that feminist theorists drawing on Foucault had addressed this. 
Issues of power in communication are important. She also drew attention to the 
UK code of ethics for social work research, currently incorporated as part of the 
British Association of Social Workers’ code (BASW, 2002). 
 
 
6) Concluding Comments  
 
Sarah Banks 
 
The process of putting together these varied and illuminating accounts of the 
presentations and responses given at the symposium has offered time for further 
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reflection on the problems and possibilities of global ethics for social work and 
the challenges facing those of us involved in drafting and redrafting international 
ethical statements. 
 
The debates about the language and validity of the international statement on 
ethics in social work clearly mirror those about the United Nations international 
declarations and covenants on human rights upon which the IFSW/IASSW 
statement is based. In striving to be internationally relevant, such statements are 
inevitably abstract and general. They are deliberately designed to be self-
standing, outside any particular ethical, cultural or religious tradition. In this sense 
they are often described as ‘thin’ (Kymlicka, 2007; Walzer, 1994). They need to 
be interpreted and implemented in specific contexts, within political regimes and 
in the light of particular ethical, cultural and religious values. Such contexts may 
be described as ‘thick’, referring to the local identities, beliefs, values and 
practices that create, colour and condition people’s everyday lives. There is 
always the problem of transfer and translation from the abstract principles to the 
particular context. The universal principles need to be ‘thin’ to be acceptable to 
all. Yet their very ‘thinness’ means they are open to wide interpretation. 
Furthermore, despite the fact that these principles are designed to be framed in a 
‘thin’ universal language, acceptable to all, many critics object that the language 
and concepts used to frame these international statements are, in fact, based in 
western liberalism, Christianity or secularism. The emphasis on individual rights 
and freedoms is expressive of a worldview rooted in western liberal democracies, 
and thus can be regarded as a continuation of the colonial imposition of the ideas 
and ways of life of one part of the world on other parts that do not necessarily 
share these values. 
 
Despite these debates and critiques, the idea of universal declarations and 
covenants and the language of international human rights have persisted since 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Later declarations and 
covenants (for example, on civil and political rights, on social, economic and 
cultural rights, and on the rights of the child) have involved greater representation 
of different countries of the world in their formulation. Whilst they are imperfect 
documents, and adherence to their principles (however interpreted) is patchy, 
they clearly play a role in attempts to create a ‘world community’ and an arena in 
which debates about minimum standards of right, wrong, good and bad can take 
place.  Interestingly, in recent years, there has been a number of statements on 
human rights produced that contextualise human rights in particular regions of 
the world or in particular religions (see, for example, the Universal Islamic 
Declaration of Human Rights (1980) and the Asian Human Rights Charter 
(1998), reproduced in Sullivan and Kymlicka, 2007). These documents are 
framed in terms of human rights and in the most part embody very similar 
principles to those of the various United Nations declarations, but have more 
emphasis on cultural and religious identities. In the case of the Islamic 
declaration, many of the rights are grounded in Islamic teaching and law. This 
suggests that the language of human rights has become broadly accepted and is 
 14 
regarded as useful, provided we recognise that it is a specially constructed 
language designed to promote international dialogue on balancing the needs, 
interests and capabilities of individuals, families, groups and states. The concept 
of ‘international human rights’ should not be equated with that of ‘individual rights’ 
in western liberal theory.  
 
Kymlicka (2007, p. 4) suggests we should regard global ethics as a two-level 
phenomenon. On one level it comprises a self-standing international discourse 
(such as that of human rights) defining a set of minimum standards agreeable to 
all. At the second level there is a range of ethical traditions each of which has its 
own account of what is needed over and above human rights. He argues that any 
coming together at the second level will be the outcome of a slow process of 
learning and mutual exchange. This suggests the importance of a process of 
constructive dialogue, and ties with the aims of the 2004 IFSW/IASSW 
statement, which include promoting ethical reflection and debate and developing 
ethical awareness.  It may seem strange, if the aim is to promote dialogue, that 
the statement takes the form of a set of principles offering prescriptions for 
action. However, just as we recognize that there is a special human rights 
discourse that provides the content of the dialogue, we also need to accept that 
the form of international ethics documents that has evolved is that of a 
prescriptive declaration or statement. Neither the content nor the form can be 
taken literally. Just like the more familiar national codes of professional ethics, 
the purposes of international ethics statements are not quite what they seem 
(Banks 2003). In addition to prescribing and guiding action, such documents are 
also rhetorical, aspirational, educational, dialogue-promoting, provocative, self-
contradictory and, above all, constantly evolving.  
 
In the context of this discussion, social work can also be viewed on two levels.  
On one level, it is a professional practice necessarily rooted in particular nation-
states, cultures, legal and policy frameworks. At another level it is also an 
international social movement, concerned to work for social justice worldwide. 
The international statement on ethics embodies both these senses of social work 
and contributes to dialogue about values, practices and ideals across 
boundaries. Hopefully the next iteration of the international statement on ethics 
for social work will reflect more clearly the ‘culturally aware universalism’ referred 
to earlier by Lynne Healy, or, to use Appiah’s (2007) phrase, the ‘rooted 
cosmopolitanism’ that is reflective of the current work of IFSW and IASSW.  
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